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Theory’s Method?
Ethnography and Critical Theory
MARIANNA POYARES
INTRODUCTION
Methodological debates in political philosophy and political the-
ory have been gaining increasing importance in academic and non-
academic spaces alike.1 Whether in the ongoing dispute between
moralism and realism or in newer formulations such as avant-garde
political theory,2 it is true to say that the debate concerning the epis-
temological and ontological commitments of research methods seems
to be experiencing a renewal after a period of relative paralysis, a
hibernation period arguably stemming from the domination of the
Rawlsian framework over mainstream Anglophone political theory.3
One particular topic of interest has been the use of ethnographic
methods, broadly understood, in political theory and political philo-
sophy.4 A number of articles have been published recently both using
1 I would like to acknowledge the crucial input, critical comments, and encouragement
provided by Edward Guetti and Tatiana Llaguno Nieves. I am also grateful to Marcos
Nobre for sending me his paper, and to Robin Celikates for his support and his push
for fine-tuning. Finally, I would like to thank the blind reviewers for their engagement.
2 Lea Ypi, Global Justice and Avant-Garde Political Agency (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011).
3 On the dominance of Rawlsianism over the political theory and political philosophy,
see Katrina Forrester, In the Shadow of Justice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2019).
4 MatthewLongo andBernardo Zacka, ‘PoliticalTheory in an Ethnographic Key’,Amer-
ican Political Science Review 1130.4 (2019), pp. 1066–70.
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and defending the use of ethnography in political theory and political
philosophy: some have adopted a tone like a manifesto while others
have made the case for its epistemic advantages. In this paper, I would
like to join this emerging trend by establishing a firmer ground that
supports the use of ethnographic methods, making clear which norm-
ative and epistemic commitments lie in the background of my claim.
My goal here is not to formulate a defence of the researchmethod itself
(which would entail an uncritical understanding of the ‘purity’ of the
method), but a defence of the use of political ethnography by critical
social theory. I will contextualize the topic within a longstanding de-
bate in Critical Theory regarding the relationship between theory and
practice, a meta-critical stance towards research methods in general,
and the issue of emancipation.
I will start by dispersing the aura of novelty or innovation pro-
posed by some supporters of the use of ethnography in political theory
and political philosophy.The recovery of certain theoretical tropes has
commonly been misidentified as innovation. This has been the case
with ethnography in social theory, which has been celebrated by virtue
of either its apparent novelty or its attachment to so-calledNewMater-
ialism. I will show that the use of such amethod has been longstanding
for feminist and postcolonial theorists, and that it also played a crucial
role in the intellectual development of authors associated with the first
generation of the Frankfurt School. My goal is to show the longstand-
ing relationship between the use of such methods by theorists that
are, in one way or another, associated with the tradition of historical
materialism. Secondly, I would like to address and criticize the associ-
ation, usually attached to the ‘novelty’ tendency outlined above, that
connects the use of ethnography with so-called ‘New Materialism’. As
‘new materialism’ is an incredibly large umbrella term encompassing
different positions, my goal here is to oppose the specific claim that
ethnography would serve the purpose of bringing the theorist closer
to ‘matter itself ’. I will do this by highlightingwhat ethnographywithin
a framework of historical materialism looks like, and what its specific
epistemic, normative, and, ultimately, (socio‐)ontological commit-
ments are. I will primarily outline the commitments of certain strands
within the large denomination of New Materialisms in terms of their
conceptions of agency, epistemology, and transhumanism. I argue that
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such commitments are radically different from theones I amproposing
as productive for the use of ethnography within historical material-
ism as a materialism that, as pointed out by Étienne Balibar, makes
no reference to matter itself.5 Finally, I will show that the notion of
social form is pivotal for the tradition of historicalmaterialism, arguing
that ethnographic methods, and the use of thick descriptions, can be
useful tools for investigating social formations while avoiding certain
ideological traps and maintaining emancipation as a goal for theory.
AGAINST NOVELTY
In his famous essay Critical and Traditional Theory, Max Horkheimer
outlines four elements that differentiate critical theory from other
types of social theory: critical theory is self-reflexive, insofar as it takes
into account its own history and conditions of theoretical formation;
it is interdisciplinary insofar as it integrates social theory, empirical
research, and philosophical analysis; it is emancipatory insofar as its
goal is the production of theory in the service of social emancipation,
stressing the connection between the production of theory and that of
liberating social change; and, finally, it is materialist in the sense that
‘it is anchored in oppositional experiences and forms of consciousness
as well as social and political struggles, from which it takes its cue, but
which it does not uncritically follow’.6
Instead of focusing on ‘simplistic questions of conscience and
clichés about justice’, taking refuge from history in morality and ‘re-
lying on the armoury of its moral indignation’, Horkheimer argued
that critique has to be based on the analysis of social reality and its
contradictions, and that it can only find its research criteria in the so-
cial practices, struggles, experiences, and self-understandings towhich
critique is connected.7 Discussions over the method or methods of
empirical research, resulting from a meta-critical stance on research
methods has been a constitutive element of Critical Theory.
5 Cf. Étienne Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx (London: Verso, 1995).
6 As appears in Robin Celikates, ‘Critical Theory and the Unfinished Project of Medi-
ating Theory and Practice’, in The Routledge Companion to the Frankfurt School, ed. by
Espen Hammer and Axel Honneth (London: Routledge, 2019), pp. 206–20 (p. 208).
7 Ibid., p. 206.
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Critical thinking is the function neither of the isolated indi-
vidual nor of a sum-total of individuals […]. The subject is no
mathematical point like the ego of bourgeois philosophy; his
activity is the construction of the social present. Furthermore,
the thinking subject is not the place where knowledge and ob-
ject coincide, nor consequently the starting point for attaining
absolute knowledge.8
Following these guidelines, it is important to note that the relevance
for social theory of conducting ethnographic research should not be
understood as a consequence of the inherent superiority of this re-
search method as such. Rather, the relevance is brought out by the
methodological scepticism towards the purported autonomyof theory
from its social present. Ethnographic research should be understood
here in a broad sense and, while participatory observation still remains
the central element, different attitudes, including (but not limited to)
historical ethnography, the observation of artefacts, or interviews, are
also essential to includewhendetailing the approach.However, the de-
scription of such research strategies, although relevant, does not fully
capture what is specific about ethnographic sensibility when it comes
to the engagement between the theorist and her object. Instead, it is
precisely the constant renegotiation of these stratifications insofar as
the object is not merely passive, but also defines the scope, nature, and
questions pertinent to the research, that is central to establishing this
ethnographic sensibility. Therefore, it is crucial that the relationship
established between the theorist and her ‘object’ is a dialectical one
and not one based onmere reporting or calculation. As a result, ethno-
graphic methods serve as a strategy for theory to ‘enter into a dynamic
unity’9 with practice, not as a privileged standpoint for the instanti-
ation of theory, but as a starting point for the constitution of theory.
Ethnographic research, in other words, constitutes an opportunity for
developing a relation between theory and practice, between the theor-
ist and the object of study, and ‘in so doing, it serves as an antidote to
analytic specialization by alerting us to the remainder — dimensions
of social reality that our existing categories fail to capture’.10
8 Max Horkheimer, ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’, in his Critical Theory: Selected
Essays (New York: Continuum, 2002), pp. 188–243 (p. 210).
9 Ibid., p. 215
10 Longo and Zacka, ‘Political Theory in an Ethnographic Key’, p. 1067.
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Thus, despite its announcement by some as a great novelty or a
new movement within political theory and political philosophy, the
use of ethnographicmethodswithin empirical research is not a novelty
within the field. Here we could mention Adorno’s use of interviews
in The Authoritarian Personality and Marcuse’s analysis of capitalist
consumerism in One-Dimensional Man as examples; however, ethno-
graphic forays have not been as present here as within Feminist and
Postcolonial theory. Ethnographic approaches have been extensively
employed by Feminist and Postcolonial scholars ever since the 70s
because they are particularly fruitfulwhen challenging universal norm-
ative claims: they can reveal the internal biases of theory and the
internal contradictions within praxis itself. Examples from these dis-
ciplines include, but are not limited to, the various contributions to
critical historiographymadeby the Subaltern Studies collective,Gloria
Anzaldúa’s use of autobiography to examine the condition of Chicana
women in the United States, Judith Butler’s analysis of various media’s
portrayals of state violence during the War on Terror to establish the
notion of grievability as a marker for radical equality, or Banu Bargu’s
work on Turkish political prisoners’ use of death fast struggle as a way
of weaponizing one’s body in an act of resistance. In spite of adopting
radically different methods, these examples coalesce under a broad
definition of ethnography. I would like to call attention to works —
best exemplified here by Bargu’s — that use political ethnography as
their main methodological framework.
Political ethnography is based on the contextual immersion of the
researcher through a number of strategies founded upon ethnographic
sensibility, such as participatory observation, first-hand interaction,
and conversational interviewing, with the goal of articulating an in-
terpretative framework for the meaning of specific social and political
practices in order to intervene in a broader theoretical debate.11 This
11 Banu Bargu provides an illuminating description of the relationship between political
ethnography and critical theory in the context of her book Starve and Immolate:
The Politics of Human Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016): ‘The
contextual immersion, observation and interaction with the participants of the death
fast struggle grant us access to highly personal, differentiated, involved narratives,
which complicate the conventional approach tohumanweapons that simply folds them
into a fear-mongering discourse of national security and terrorism. But the voices of
those near or at the helm of the state also show how the participants of the death fast
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kind of research allows critical social theory to ‘problemati[ze] re-
descriptions’,12 that is, to challenge theoretical presuppositions and
vocabularies. Additionally, ‘to adopt an ethnographic sensibility is to
remain open to the idea that our object of study is not just a “case”
to examine in relation to theories we hold independently, but some-
thing that tells us more than we knew to ask’.13 In other words, the
use of political ethnography in social theory moves beyond traditional
inductive methodological frameworks, where empirical research is
structured to respond to a previously assembled set of questionswhose
‘sources’ or points of conflict have been previously diagnosed or pre-
dicted and merely await empirical confirmation. On the contrary, the
usefulness of ethnography for critical social theory is precisely that it
enables a reciprocal relation between theory and practice. When the
four distinctive elements of critical social theory mentioned above —
interdisciplinarity, materiality, emancipation, and self-reflexivity —
are brought into relation with ethnography, three important elements
of the latter approach come to light. The first, which I have just men-
tioned, is empirical research without the reduction of the object of
analysis to the mere instantiation of theory, such as in a case study.
The second is the insistence on thick, detailed descriptions as a starting
point for theoretical inquiry. The third positions the theorist not as
a universal subject but as an individual belonging to a specific class,
gender, and race while arguably maintaining a speculative vantage
point.
Political ethnography is a useful tool for social theory given its
insistence on not grounding the field of research upon the primacy of
a priori, abstract, notions of justice or equality, for instance, but rather
by looking at how such notions are articulated in the social vocab-
ulary, and how they are enacted and performed by different social
groups. It does not begin with an abstract concept but with a ‘concrete’
concept, so to speak, insofar as it relies on thick descriptions of the
struggle and their actionswere perceived […]bringing into light the articulation of the
historical, structural, ideological and pragmatic reason for the choice of strategies that
were deployed by the state to address the struggle. […]The resulting analysis troubles
an easy judgement, I think, and thereby aspires to keep open a space in which critical
theory can operate’ (pp. xiii and xiv).
12 Longo and Zacka, ‘Political Theory in an Ethnographic Key’, p. 1066.
13 Ibid., p. 1067.
MARIANNA POYARES 351
rsocial and political arena. The starting point here described as ‘thick
descriptions’ should be understood both as a description itself as well
as a critical availability to the act of describing on the part of the the-
orist, which can possibly include the reformulation of her theoretical
vocabulary. The availability of such a critical perspective also allows
for further possible identification of contingent phenomena within
established orders, opening up the space of normative inquiry towards
unforeseen circumstances. In other words, it allows for the possible
identification of internal contradictionswithin normalizing structures,
whether in the realm of political phenomena, normative vocabulary,
or by highlighting the intrinsic forms of violence and exclusion within
such structures.
Finally, a distinctive element of political ethnography that is ex-
tremely relevant for empirically engaged social theory is the issue of
positionality.The position of the social theorist is neither camouflaged
in order to endorse a specific or exemplary kind of objectivity nor,
by means of its affirmation, is it considered to signify an automatic
embrace of relativism — both of which are equally symptomatic of
an understanding of theory that stands above and outside relations of
power and ideological structures. Therefore, the emphatic inclusion
of positionality must entail more than just a mere addition of a few
descriptive lines containing the private history of the scholar, or some-
thing like a private confession of the individual in question alongside
or within their research findings. What positionality ‘positions’ is not
the theorist as an individual but theorizing as a practice. A critically
engaged use of positionality serves to dispel the aura of epistemic priv-
ilege of the theorist by including her self-understanding as an element
of analysis insofar as this understanding constitutes a reflection on the
conditions of the actuality of the research itself. It represents a break
with the dogmas of objectivism and scientism while, at the same time,
avoiding falling into relativism.
Positionality — just like thick descriptions — places the focus on
the dialectical and relational aspect of the research. This element is
one that has had very little historical resonance amongst philosophers,
even those that did engage with empirical research. Adorno and Mar-
cuse, for instance, despite their critical eye towards positivism in the
social sciences, and their insistence on the dual character of empirical
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research (both normative and descriptive), have not included what
I am here defining as positionality in the scope of their methodolo-
gical inquiries. Postcolonial and feminist theorists, on the other hand,
have engaged extensively with positionality, showing how supposedly
impartial and universal normative standards are biased in relation to,
mainly but not exclusively, gender and race.14
A RETURN TO MATTER
The concern with providing clarity for the relational constitution of
the research itself is particularly relevant when working with social
movements and oppressed groups. However, in recent years, many
projects within the humanities and the social sciences have developed
an increasing interest in non-human objects and nature, advocating a
return tomateriality in order to providenew interpretative frameworks
for the social world. The so-called New Materialism consists of a het-
erogeneous field and assembles under this umbrella term a number of
thinkers and theories that do not necessarily stand in perfect harmony
with one another. Given the range of the term, I do not claim that all
authors identified as New Materialists strictly follow or would even
necessarily agree with the description I offer below, and if I did not
properly acknowledge this fact it might render my criticism unfair or
irrelevant for some positions.What I offer is a defence of ethnographic
methods within critical social theory that stands in contrast to some
descriptions that have been offered as paradigmatic in the New Ma-
terialist Turn. The reason I bring this dialogue into the debate about
the relevance of ethnographic research methods within critical social
theory is precisely because this move has, on multiple occasions, been
identified as a trend within new materialism, understood as a strategy
of approximation between the researcher and ‘matter itself ’. I would
like to mark the difference between this trend and the use of such a
method within canonical examples of historical materialism precisely
to provide a sharp distinction in what is considered to be the relevance
of such a method: while New Materialists claim that ethnographic
14 See, for instance, Charles Mills, The Racial Contract (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1997).
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research enables the coming into relationwithmaterial agency, the one
that I am proposing, associated with historical materialism, claims no
reference to matter itself.
The New Materialist Turn is usually associated with two areas
‘where there is sufficient overlapping around a distinctive reorienta-
tion for these areas to serve as identifying markers of new materialist
thinking’.15 The first is a renewed interest in non-anthropocentric,
matter-oriented ontology. This ontological commitment arises out of
what is portrayed to be a rupture with the Kantian paradigm that,
it is claimed, inaugurated a ‘general anti-realist trend’ marked by a
strong representationalism that emphasizes the mediation of reality
by epistemic and linguistic processes. The main charge against rep-
resentationalism, however, seems to lie not so much on the grounds
of this mediation as it does on an unargued (in the case of Kant) yet
historically entrenched understanding of matter as, itself, passive. The
excessive weight conferred, amongst others by the Kantian tradition,
upon a nexus of normative interaction, between what is supposed to
be inert matter and the spiritual bestowals that grant matter its proper
dynamicity, is identified as a questionable theoretical assumption un-
derpinning the anthropocentric character of Western thought. In an
effort to dislocate and challenge this tradition, one of the main argu-
ments of the New Materialists — one that serves to dismantle binary
distinctions such as nature/culture and organic/inorganic — is their
emphasis on matter’s agency. This is the second distinctive area of
interest for New Materialists.
New Materialist ontology, also known as vital materialism or ma-
terial vitalism, does not understand matter as fixed and inert but as a
continuous and, more importantly, as a contingent process of materi-
alization. According to Diana Coole:
Firstly, this is not about Being, but becoming: crucially, what is
invoked is a process not a state, a process of materialisation in
which matter literally matters itself. Secondly, this is not, then,
the dead, inert, passive matter of the mechanist, which relied
on an external agent— human or divine— to set it in motion.
15 DianaCoole, ‘AgenticCapacities andCapaciousHistoricalMaterialism:Thinkingwith
NewMaterialisms in thePolitical Sciences’,Millennium: Journal of International Studies
41.3 (2013), pp. 451–69 (p. 452).
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Rather, it is amaterialisation that contains its own energies and
forces of transformation. It is self-organising, sui generis.16
Therefore, contingent processes of self-constitution are expressions of
the intrinsic constitution and rationality of matter, understood here
not only as sui generis but, more importantly, as causa sui. The argu-
ment that matter, itself, is agential and not inert references the philo-
sophyofGillesDeleuze andFélixGuattari as laying the foundations for
vital materialism. This is seen in the case of Rosi Braidotti’s argument
for the intelligent vitality, or self-organizing capacity, of matter, which
leads to a ‘zoe-centred egalitarianism’ wherein the shift from agency
to agentic capacities stands against a tradition that associates agency
with (human) volition, deliberation, and intellect.17 By moving from
agency to agentic capacities, newmaterialists have argued that ‘agentic
capacities are diffused across many different types of material entity’
and that this ‘decouple[s] agency fromhumanswhile raising questions
about the nature of life and of the place or status of the human within
it’.18 Such capacities are, according to this view, proper tomatter itself;
they are contingently revealed in interactions, which, understood here
beyond the anthropocentric fixation on agency, allows for a collapsing
of the traditional dualisms such as nature/culture which I referred to
earlier.
The transhumanist and vitalist focus on agentic capacities arises
out of very different arguments. My concern here is with the so-called
neo-ontological materialisms which draw upon quantum physics or
upon general descriptions of biological processes that understand
vitalism to occur in a spontaneous speculative organization of nat-
ural processes. In this perspective matter is conceptualized under the
framework of relational ontology in the sense that being, or matter,
is constituted by dynamic relationships between elements. Susanne
Lettow has argued that this position results in two shortcomings. The
first concerns epistemology, which, in this context, is no longer under-
stood as the critical interrogation of knowledge claims, including the
claim to know matter itself. Lettow takes issue with Karen Barad’s
16 Ibid., p. 453
17 Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), p. 60.
18 Coole, ‘Agentic Capacities’, p. 457.
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important contribution by highlighting how, despite her attention to
distinct features of human cognition, she positions intelligibility as an
expression of matter’s agency. Therefore ‘practices of knowing cannot
be fully claimed as human practices, not simply because we use non-
human elements in our practices but because knowing is a matter of
part of the world making itself intelligible to another part’.19 Life, as
matter, is understood here as a cosmological force, as the unfolding
of natural processes, as an expressions of the intelligent organization
and reorganization ofmatter, and generically described as a primordial
logic of being where ‘epistemic practices are articulated as part of a
metaphysical, even cosmological logic of anonymous forces that shape
the world’.20 The problem with this kind of approach is that by assum-
ing material agency to be conceptually expressive, it not only rejects
theKantian paradigmunderwhich there is no unmediated knowledge,
no knowledge of things in themselves, but actually brings us to a pre-
critical standpoint inwhich the refusal ofmediation becomes a totality
of theory or, from a different perspective, the intelligible organization
of nature.
This epistemic immediacy— one could even say, epistemic trans-
parency—ofmatter forecloses a deeper engagementwith critical epis-
temology. ‘With regard to epistemology, the attempt to conceive of the
totality of being, the quest for a direct and immediate access to being
or the real rejects the always precarious and partial position of the
epistemic subject’.21 Material vitality does not, per se, entail the dissol-
ution of epistemic questions regarding the production of knowledge,
the categorization of phenomena and its social-historical conditions
— not unless we also adopt substantive metaphysical or epistemic
commitments such as understanding intelligibility as an expression of
material vitality. In the same vein, a rejection of the nature/culture div-
ision does not entail an adoption of posthumanism in which we erase
the very specific relationships at play between human and non-human
actors.DonnaHaraway, in her essay ‘SituatedKnowledges’, reminds us
19 Karen Barad, ‘Posthumanist Performativity: Toward anUnderstanding of HowMatter
Comes to Matter’, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 28.3 (2003), pp.
801–31 (p. 829).
20 Susanne Lettow, ‘Turning the Turn: New Materialism, Historical Materialism and
Critical Theory’, Thesis Eleven, 140.1 (2017), pp. 106–21 (p. 109).
21 Ibid., p. 110.
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that ‘theworld neither speaks itself nor disappears in favour of amaster
decoder’.22 The issue of a presumed disappearance is precisely why I
call this erasure of epistemology in favour of the intelligible immediacy
of matter ‘dogmatic’ in the Kantian sense of the term.
Furthermore, there is a second problematic element associated
with this reading of material vitalism, represented by theories such
as Braidotti’s zoe-centred egalitarianism. By uncritically adopting a
supposedly generic language such as ‘flows’, ‘exchanges’, and ‘fields of
forces’ to describe all phenomena, such theories violently flatten rad-
ically different phenomena, especially social phenomena. By assuming
ontological parity between the vitality of atoms in their exchange of
electrons and the vitality of social interactions, equating them under
generic descriptions such as ‘agential assemblages’, one assumes that
power relations and physical forces are both epistemically transparent
and ontologically analogous. This kind of interpretation blurs the dis-
tinction between (socially and historically constituted) human agency
and non-human agency, and thereby creates a second foreclosure: that
of the normative, political, dimension of human agency.23 As a result,
the normative and emancipatory character of theory are eclipsed.
It is important to note that a critique of discrete matter along the
lines of the critique of the Newtonian model doesn’t of itself amount
to the speculative transparency ofmaterial vitality, nor to a description
of agency that collapses the structural disparities between human and
non-human agency. Such a position is not the first awakening from the
22 Donna Haraway, ‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the
Privilege of Partial Perspective’, Feminist Studies 14.3 (1988), pp. 575–99 (p. 593). I
use Haraway here as an example of an author associated with New Materialism who,
nonetheless, does not share the view that I am criticizing in this paper. I do this on
purpose in order to also illustrate that, despite my criticism, given the comprehensive-
ness of the term ‘new materialist’ and the different positions associated with it, there
is certainly a good deal of opportunity for approximations and alliances with historical
materialism.
23 Lettow, ‘Turning the Turn’, p. 111: ‘The general problem here is that agency is trans-
ferred to anonymous, meta-historical forces like matter or life, and this means that
social relations and the practices they result from cannot be adequately analyzed.
This includes the highly specific and historically contingent forms of human-nature
relations and socio-technological regimes that need to be studied with regard to the
very specific and highly stratified assemblages of “human” and “nonhuman” agents. To
analyze such assemblages would require a differentiated theory of subjectivity which
is able to distinguish between the specific forms of dynamics, activity and praxis that
characterize the different entities.’
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great slumber of hylomorphism because critiques of hylomorphism
have been present throughout the history of philosophy. This begs
the question — what kind of materialism is historical materialism if
it is not one committed to an engagement with matter itself? This is
a question surrounded by extensive debate and a longstanding his-
tory. Theorists associated with the first generation of the Frankfurt
School such as Horkheimer, Marcuse, and Adorno, as well as others
whomoved away from the scientificism of early historical materialism,
sought to emphasize the social and historical aspects of theory as such,
andnot only of social theory.This does not necessarily imply the denial
ofmaterial vitality, but it does insist that any understanding ofmaterial
vitality is socially and historically determined.
A RESEARCH METHOD FOR A THEORY OF SOCIAL FORM
I would like to call attention to a crucially relevant distinction within
Marxist theory, namely the focus on the commodity form as a real
phantasmagoria.24 In his writings regarding the current status of
idealism and materialism, Marx alluded to the pitfalls of the ideal-
ist/materialist debate of his time by stressing the well-known short-
comings of idealismalongwith thoseof amaterialism thatmakes direct
references to bodies and objects as haunted by an idealist founda-
tion.25 The famous passage on the fetishism of the commodity, usually
read as the intervention of the notion of praxis over idealist structural-
24 This specific focus on the commodity, and its concern with labour as the kind of prac-
tice that institutes it, has been identified by some, e.g. Bruno Latour, as fundamentally
anthropocentric. Judith Butler has recentlymade the case against this interpretation by
recuperating Marx’s notions of the organic and the inorganic body stressing how the
kind of agency that is actualized in labour is dialectically constituted by non-human
agency as well. Cf. Judith Butler, ‘The Inorganic Body in the Early Marx: A Concept-
Limit in Anthropocentrism’, Radical Philosophy, 2.6 (Winter 2019), pp. 3–17.
25 ‘He also saw very clearly that, from this point of view, the “old materialisms” or
philosophies of nature, which substitute matter for mind as the organizing principle,
contain a strong element of idealism and are, in the end, merely disguised idealisms
(whatever their very different political consequences). This enables us to understand
why it is so easy for idealism to “comprehend” materialism and therefore to refute it or
integrate it (as we see inHegel, who has no problemwithmaterialisms, except perhaps
with that of Spinoza, but Spinoza is a rather atypical materialist … )’ (Balibar, The
Philosophy of Marx, p. 24).
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ism, can also be read as an argument against a reductionist ontological
materialism.
The mysterious character of the commodity-form consists
therefore simply in the fact that the commodity reflects the
social characteristics of men’s own labour as objective char-
acteristics of the products of labour themselves, as the social-
natural properties of these things. Hence it also reflects the
social relation of the producers to the sum total of labour as
social relation between objects, a relation which exists apart
from and outside the producers. Through this substitution,
the products of labour become commodities, sensuous things
which are at the same time supra-sensible or social.26
Furthermore, the mystery of the commodity form cannot be solved
by redirecting our gaze to the object as ‘simple’ matter, or to the body
as a ‘simple’ body, precisely because bodies are already constituted
by systems of differential categorization, articulation, identification,
and hierarchization, and it is not in the ‘materiality of the body’ that
one would find the justification for, or grounding principle of, its
commodification.
[T]he commodity form, and the value relation of the products
of labour within which it appears, have absolutely no con-
nection with the physical nature of the commodity and the
material [dinglich] relations arising out of this. It is nothing
but the definite social relation betweenmen themselves which
assumes here, for them, the fantastic formof a relation between
things. […] As the foregoing analysis has already demon-
strated, this fetishism of the world of commodities arises from
the peculiar social character of the labour which produces
them.27
The object of critical social theory, therefore, cannot be matter itself,
given that the significance of material reality as such is already de-
termined by social and historical relations. The very impetus to find
the ground of social formations in ‘pure matter’ is already a symptom
of fetishism. For example, a body that is marked as female ‘expresses
26 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, 3 vols (London: Penguin, 1976),
i, trans. by Ben Fowkes, pp. 164–65.
27 Ibid., p. 165.
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female experience at a particular time and place, located within a par-
ticular set of social relations’.28 By understanding the commodity form
as a social form and focusing on this ‘real abstraction’ as one of the
central elements of his theory, Marx implodes the old antagonism
between idealism and materialism by showing how the two are not
mutually exclusive but mutually dependent.
What concerns us here is the objectivity of the ‘phantasmagorical’
phenomenon of the commodity. By shifting the focus of inquiry from
matter ‘itself ’ or reason to social formations, and by understanding
social formations not as instantiations of abstract categories but as
historically determined, real abstractions,Marx collapses the apparent
division of matter/form into the unity of a social form. Additionally,
abandoning the paradigm of individual agency as foundational for ac-
tion and focusing on the conditions of possibility of action means that
the urge to liberate agency from the schema of subjective volition and
deliberation—which somehave associatedwith theKantian tradition
— appears incredibly superfluous, given that representations, even
those of ‘matter itself ’, are already expressions of a collective life. Crit-
ical social theory fulfils the dual criteria of being aware that it emerges
out of the same object that it enquires into — that is, social form —
and it is only by virtue of this that it can satisfy the four elements
mentioned earlier: being emancipatory, interdisciplinary, materialist,
and self-reflexive.
Historical materialism stands, therefore, as a ‘materialism that
has nothing to do with a reference to matter’. The term ‘materialism
28 Nancy Hartsock, ‘The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically
Feminist Historical Materialism’, in Disovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epis-
temology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, ed. by Sandra Harding
and Merrill B. Hintikka (New York: Kluwer, 1983), pp. 283–310 (p. 303). On this
topic, Joseph Fracchia makes an important argument regarding the contribution of
historical materialism: ‘Although gender is a cultural construct, if humans reproduced
asexually, there would be no foundation for its construction. The problem lies not in
the recognition of physiological differences, but in the issuance of hierarchical ver-
dicts on their significance that both produce and support exploitation, oppression and
discrimination. The particular content of those semiotic forms cannot be predicted
by any general theory. But it can be analysed in a historical-materialist manner and
understood as the particular product of people living within a specific set of social
relations inscribing particular meanings onto what are constructed as racialised or
gendered bodies’ ( Joseph Fracchia, ‘Beyond the Nature-Human Debate: Human Cor-
poreal Organization as First Fact of Historical Materialism’, Historical Materialism,
13.1 (2005), pp. 33–62 (p. 56)).
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without matter’, used by Balibar in his The Philosophy of Marx, was
borrowed from a letter from Jacobi to Fichte. The object of historical
materialist critique is a (real) living phantasmagoria created by the
inversion between labour and value, where labour seems to have been
socialized by the value-form. The reference to ‘materialism without
matter’ contains the need for a profound rethinking of the constitution
of (social) objectivity as well as that of subjectivity. These debates
about the mutual constitution of objectivity and subjectivity, as well
as that of theory and practice, have been longstanding and must be in-
terpreted as developments of the debate concerning form and matter,
where the notion of social form, or ‘social formations’ — to avoid a
language that could be interpreted as reificatory— is the object of his-
torical material critique. If the objects of critique are social formations,
then such formations are not transparent because their constitutive
processes of inversion, such as that of labour and value, are made
opaque, among others, by ideological structures. The question here
is not one of proceeding by assuming the falsity of social form and
searching for its origin or genetic codehiddenwithin themere illusions
of social formations, but rather of analysing its internal contradictions.
To put it another way, contradictions are not the expression or the
explosion of a hidden, suppressed, raw genetic element, but rather
developments which potentially expose the social and historical char-
acter of the phantasmagoria at play, potentially leading to change.
The four elements of critical social theory outlined in the first sec-
tion of this paper (reflexive, interdisciplinary, materialist, and emanci-
patory) stand not as a mere list of intentions but as a development of
this notion of social form as well as what theory, and its relationship to
practice, entails. From the elements mentioned, the element concern-
ing the emancipatory character of theory has generally been regarded
as aspirational when it is, in fact, structural. As Balibar writes,
the theme of domination must thus be at the centre of the
discussion.Marx does not produce a theory of the constitution
of ideologies as discourses, as particular or general systems of
representation and thenmerely retrospectively raises the ques-
tion of domination: that question is always already included in
the elaboration of the concept.29
29 Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx, p. 45.
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Moreover, the recent dominance of debates concerning the normative
standards of critique has eclipsed the traditional discussion regarding
the relationship between theory and practice, which has led to accus-
ations of stagnation within critical theory. The return to such a debate
is crucial because of its ability to fulfil the emancipatory potential
of theory through simultaneously placing the relationship of theory-
making and practice at the centre, avoiding the dogmatic separation
between theorist and non-theorist, and denying the premise that the
self-understanding of agents is irrelevant, or even detrimental, to em-
pirical research.
As these challenges and the foundational problems they stem
from — that of the methodological status of critical theory, its
relation to practice, and the corresponding role of the critical
theorist — are still with us today, one hopes they will no
longer be pushed into the background by the dominance of the
debate on the normative standards of critique but be discussed
in their own right. […] This suggests that the emancipatory
orientation of critical theory is internally linked to its double
reflexivity: only reflection on the context in which a theory
emerged and in which it is used — a twofold dependency of
theory on practice — enables an adequate understanding of
the practical character of theory itself, and thus a break with
the dogma of scientism and objectivism.30
The re-awakening of the question of the relationship between theory
and practice entails, necessarily, a re-awakening of the discussion re-
garding methodology. And it is equally interesting to note how the
prevalence of debates concerning the normative standards of social
theoryhas also side-lined thediscussion regarding empirically engaged
research methods. Although social movements and institutions have
been a preferential object of research for critical theorists, a number of
questions remain regarding the actualization of research: how to pro-
ceed, and how to select which social struggles to focus upon, in a world
of total administration and totalizing domination? In a world where, in
contrast to fifty years ago, ‘socialism is no longer the focus of emanci-
patory hopes; social movements have proliferated in a decentred way;
30 Celikates, ‘Critical Theory’, pp. 217–18.
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and value horizons have been pluralized’?31 How can critical social
theory be pursued in a society where domination is experienced as
freedom? Or should critical theorists, as Nancy Fraser suggests, not
only engage with normative analysis but also with proposing program-
matic and institutional solutions?32 I do not wish to claim that the
adoption of a specific methodology alone would supply an answer to
such questions, although the reflection on the importance of method-
ology constitutes part of the theorist’s commitment to answering such
challenges. Nonetheless, whether or not critical theorists have a norm-
ative or more programmatic goal they definitely benefit immensely
from empirically engaged research,maintaining the old ‘unity between
practice and theory’ as a central concern.
If critical theory is sequestered from social engagement and
activism, vacating the very domain from which the political
problematic emerges, it deprives itself of the capacity to trace
that very emergence. This important relation between work-
ing inside and outside of the academy is linked to the further
problem of the border between the university and its world.
Such a critical practice neither takes distance from facts nor
negates their existence or importance; on the contrary, a con-
stellation of such ‘facts’ impresses itself upon our thinking, and
so the world acts on us and exercises a historical demand on
thought.33
By understanding theory as the relation between theorist and object,
and by relying on thick descriptions as the starting point of theoretical
inquiry, political ethnography provides a useful platform for social
theory while having real current struggles as its main focus point.
Moreover, such research disavows any presupposition of ‘automatic
translation of social position into epistemic privilege, and of epistemic
31 Marcos Nobre, ‘How Practical Can Critical Theory Be?’, in Critical Theory and the
Challenge of Praxis, ed. by Stefano Giacchetti Ludovisi (New York: Routledge, 2016),
pp. 159–72 (p. 167).
32 Cf. Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political- Philo-
sophical Exchange (London: Verso, 2003), pp. 198–99: ‘Unlike their predecessors,
finally, today’s critical theorists cannot assume that all normatively justified claims will
converge on a single programme for institutional change. Rather, they must take on
the hard cases — those, for example, in which claims for minority cultural recognition
conflict with claims for gender equality — and tell us how to resolve them’. Also in
Nobre, ‘How Practical Can Critical Theory Be?’, p. 167.
33 Butler, ‘The Inorganic Body’, p. 4.
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privilege into political progressiveness’,34 which, alongside the use of
naïve and vague descriptions of social movements — either through
superficial or instrumental engagement with such movements, when
the theorist engages with political practice only to locate his already-
tailored research questions — constitute two extremely problematic
features of empirically engaged theory. Ethnographic research is par-
ticularly attentive to ideological traps that may not only be invisible
to the theorist but also to the activist while, arguably, maintaining
a specifically emancipatory role for critique. On the other hand, the
critical theorist must enter a relation of partnership with those around
her, ‘a dialogical struggle for appropriate interpretations and the real-
ization of transformative potentials’,35 for which positionality, under-
stood here not as mere subjective expression, but also as attention
to unforeseen biases and blockages while also engaging in dialogical
interpretations and realizations of emancipatory potentials, is an im-
portant element. Finally, it makes the speculative vocabulary available
to redescriptions, as well as to the reflections and input made by those
engaged with the social struggle. Political ethnography is a fruitful
method for transforming the asymmetry between theorist and activ-
ist into a dialogical relation, but only if we understand critical social
theory as already being a social practice.
34 Celikates, ‘Critical Theory’, p. 217.
35 Ibid., p. 218.
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